ABSTRACT In US vaccine markets, competing producers with high fixed, sunk costs face relatively concentrated demand. The resulting price and quality competition leads to the exit of all but one or very few producers per vaccine. Our empirical analysis of exits from US vaccine markets supports the hypothesis that high fixed costs and both price and quality competition contribute to vaccine exits. We find no evidence that government purchasing has significant effects, possibly because government purchase tends to increase volume but lower price, with offsetting effects. Evidence from the flu vaccine market confirms that government purchasing is not a necessary condition for exits and the existence of few suppliers per vaccine in the US.
Introduction
Vaccines can provide an extremely cost-effective technology for dealing with infectious diseases, saving lives and averting millions of dollars of potential health expenditures. 1 But the supply of pediatric vaccines in the US appears precarious, with a declining number of producers and products. In 1967 there were 26 licensed manufacturers, but only 12 in 2002. Five firms produce almost all routine childhood vaccines, with a sole supplier for five of the eight recommended pediatric vaccines.
2 When key suppliers experience manufacturing problems, supply interruptions and vaccine shortages interrupt immunization schedules, sometimes leading to children not being immunized. For flu vaccine, supply shortages during the narrow annual window for effective administration have posed risks to vulnerable populations.
Not all is gloom and doom in the vaccine business, however. Historically, entry of firms and products has been rapid when scientific advance creates new opportunities. Global vaccine sales doubled during the 1990s, from $2.9 billion in 1992 to over $6 billion in 2000, 3 although global sales of basic vaccines dropped 40% over the same period. 4 Global vaccine sales increased 16% from 2008-09, reaching $22.1 billion. 5 This growth reflects new pediatric products, including varicella, rotovirus and childhood pneumococcal vaccines, in addition to travel and adult vaccines, including a cervical cancer vaccine and new vaccine combinations. Vaccine manufacturers spend about 16% of sales on R&D, a comparable ratio to the pharmaceutical industry. Some large pharmaceutical companies have recently entered the vaccine industry through acquisition (for example, Pfizer's $68 billion purchase of Wyeth was partly for its vaccine business; Novartis acquired Chiron, Abbott purchased Solvay), and several biotech firms have entered in the US and other countries. Thus precarious supply of existing vaccines co-exists with healthy entry to produce new vaccines.
The industrial organization literature has proposed general models of entry and exit to an industry (Caves, 1998) . Entry has been modeled to reflect such factors as entry barriers, whether set-up costs are retrievable or "sunk", potential entry and exit of competitors, the extent of product substitutability etc. Theories of withdrawal from markets include some of the same but also some different explanations, such as intrafirm cannibalization or interfirm competition in multiproduct competition settings (Ruebeck, 2005) , declining demand (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985; 1990) , age of the firm, firm size, and industryspecific characteristics, such as the extent of scale economies, the dynamics of the demand and knowledge conditions. Entry and exit have also been modeled as interrelated phenomena, with authors finding a high correlation between average entry and exit rates, across time and within industries, supporting the incorporation of entry as a determinant of exit and vice-versa (Carree and Thurik, 1996; Disney et al., 2003; Dunne et al., 1988) . The dynamic processes governing an industry's structure include learning effects, both by producers (Jovanovic, 1992) and consumers, replacement and displacement effects (Carree and Thurik, 1996) , and the emergence of a dominant design. Studies also examine levels of market concentration and its consequences for welfare. For example, industries with a low flow of entry and exit may be have limited innovativeness and some form of formal or tacit collusion (Geroski et al., 1985) ; on the other hand, a continuous change of competitors may be socially inefficient, particularly in activities with significant investment of capital, time and knowledge. This paper focuses on exit from (and to a lesser extent entry to) the vaccine industry from 1903 to 2005. We draw on some of the factors considered in the general industrial organization literature but also factors specific to vaccines. Compared to most industries (but similar to other pharmaceuticals), the vaccine industry is highly R&D intensive and heavily regulated, in the US by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and by similar authorities in other countries, with high regulatory costs of entry and continued operations. However, unlike most other pharmaceuticals in the US, vaccines also face government as a significant customer, at least for the pediatric vaccines that are recommended 240 P.M. Danzon and N.S. Pereira by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Previous economic analyses of the vaccine industry have focused on the role of government procurement in general -and government price setting in particular -in making vaccine markets less attractive than markets for other pharmaceuticals. Liability risks have also allegedly made vaccines unattractive. We posit that exogenous advances in basic science create the potential to produce new and/or improved vaccines against specific diseases such as hepatitis B, rotovirus etc. Following such a knowledge shock, several firms may engage in R&D to apply this knowledge to produce a vaccine product. This R&D race may result in several, slightly differentiated products that meet regulatory requirements for safety and efficacy entering the market at different times. Even if one product has been approved, other firms may rationally continue with their clinical trials, given the ex ante risks associated with regulatory approval and market acceptance and the fact that significant research costs may already be sunk. We document but do not model this entry process.
Our model of vaccine exits posits that, for a given technology, the vaccine production process is subject to non-increasing costs over a range that may suffice to serve the entire US market. For public and private purchasers, the cross-price elasticity of demand between substitutable products is high and purchasing is structured such that firms adopt non-cooperative, Bertrand pricing strategies. If multiple firms enter the market with close substitutable products and each faces low and non-increasing marginal cost up to the scale of the market, non-cooperative pricing implies that prices could potentially fall to marginal cost. This creates pressures for all but one product to eventually exit. Products that have higher marginal costs, shocks to fixed costs (such as the need to build new plants) or less desirable safety, efficacy or convenience attributes for consumers are more likely to exit. Prices for the surviving product(s) may nevertheless be constrained by contestability from foreign or previous entrants and/or monopsony power of purchasers, with the relative importance of these factors differing across vaccine types.
In this model, new product entry to a vaccine type usually occurs in waves, following technological or market changes. Exits are triggered by quality and potential price competition, including dynamic entry of superior products, and by regulatory or other shocks that raise costs of incumbent firms or reduce demand. In this model, government procurement as practiced by the CDC reduces prices primarily by exacerbating competition by design of the bidding process, not because the government imposes price regulation. On the other hand, government involvement through vaccine recommendations and mandates increases quantity demanded, and hence may increase the expected number of products/firms in a market, cet. par. Given these offsetting effects of government on price and volume, the net effect of government involvement on number of suppliers or vaccine exit is theoretically ambiguous and must be determined empirically.
Our empirical analysis tests these hypotheses related to vaccine exit using data on vaccine license terminations between 1901 and 2003. The results confirm that the hazard of exit increases with number of competitors and is more likely following the entry of new competitors, whereas sole suppliers are less likely to exit. We find that over time, the vaccine industry has become much more demanding and exit propensities increased after the mid 1960s, which may reflect several factors: higher FDA safety, efficacy and manufacturing and possibly increasing government purchase of some vaccines after the mid 1960s. Correlation between these three trends precludes indentifying their separate effects. However, we do not find support for the common assertion that price regulation by the CDC or its share of volume purchased has contributed to vaccine exit, plausibly because these effects are offsetting. This finding, that government purchase on balance has no negative effect on firms' willingness to remain in the market, is consistent with the theoretical prediction, that competitive markets would likely lead to one or very few suppliers in the long run, given the cost structure of vaccine supply, the relatively small market compared to many pharmaceuticals and limited storability of most vaccines. This finding is also consistent with casual evidence that vaccine producers in fact seek out government recommendation and purchase of their vaccines.
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Section 2 of the paper describes previous related literature. Section 3 outlines our model of vaccine supply and market equilibrium. Section 4 describes the data and methods. Section 5 provides descriptive evidence on vaccine entry and exits. Section 5 reports hazard model estimates of exit for individual vaccine products (licenses) and for vaccine producers. Section 6 presents evidence on vaccine availability in Canada, France, Portugal and the UK, compared to the US, and section 7 provides a case study of the flu vaccine market in the US that illustrates the importance of high fixed costs and demand uncertainty.
Previous Literature
An extensive previous economic literature describes the institutional structure of vaccine supply and purchase, the economic case of mandatory vaccination, and appropriate subsidies for vaccine demand through reimbursement (see IOM, 1985 IOM, , 2003 and papers therein). A more limited number of papers examine the effects of CDC procurement on prices and on vaccine shortages (e.g. Salkever and Frank, 1996) . Kauf (1999) uses data from 1997-92 on private catalog and federal contract prices for three vaccines (DTP, OPV and MMR) and 1988-92 for Hib and Hep B to test empirically whether the public discount percentage is more consistent with price discrimination or bargaining power. She concludes that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, results favor the bargaining power hypothesis. This conclusion is based primarily on finding a positive association between the public discount percent and the public share of volume. She does not explicitly consider the role of competition and treats number of suppliers as exogenous. She finds that the public discount off private catalog price is also positively related to number of licenses, which she interprets as consistent with the bargaining hypothesis but also with price discrimination. Both these studies use data that ignores private sector discounts and predates CDC's shift away from winner-take-all procurement.
Scherer (2007) takes a more general approach to vaccine shortages. He considers high regulatory costs, inadequate profitability and mergers as possible causes of vaccine shortages, and argues that economies of scale and scope limit the number of vaccine producers. Focusing on the influenza vaccine and assuming that shortages entail foregone vaccination, he provides rough estimates of the costs of vaccine shortages and concludes that maintaining additional production sources with surge capacity would be cost-justified.
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Scherer's view of vaccine markets as natural monopolies in some ways resembles our hypothesis; however, he does not consider the dynamic competition process whereby multiple firms enter and then most exit, and his empirical analysis focuses on simulating welfare costs of shortages for influenza, not the determinants of product and firm exit which are the focus of our analysis.
Vaccine Market Characteristics

Demand
Although vaccines are highly effective at disease prevention, their success is a winner's curse for producers: the longer the treatment efficacy, the smaller is the annual volume demanded. For pediatric vaccines that have lifetime efficacy, potential annual sales volume is limited by the size of the birth cohort. Moreover, idiosyncratic government vaccination policies result in different pediatric vaccine requirements across countries. The potential annual demand is therefore lower for most vaccine formulations than for many therapeutic drugs, especially drugs to treat chronic diseases. For adult vaccines and travelers vaccines, efficacy lasts for several years, hence booster doses are necessary to maintain protection, but usage is generally limited to at-risk subpopulations. Governments in all industrialized countries require and often subsidize vaccination against major contagious diseases. The rationale is that the social benefits of vaccination exceed private benefits, because a person who gets vaccinated reduces the probability that they themselves get the disease and that they transmit it to others. As more individuals in a group receive vaccination, the risk of contagion for those who remain unvaccinated declines to negligible levels -socalled herd immunity -which in turn creates an incentive for each individual to free ride on vaccination of others, unless vaccination is mandatory. In the US, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is an advisory body comprised of medical experts who recommend vaccination schedules for specific subpopulations. For some pediatric vaccines, compliance with these recommendations may be required for school attendance, which makes the recommendations essentially a mandate. Government recommendations and mandates presumably increase total volume sold for recommended vaccines, compared to unconstrained voluntary market demand. But government recommendation or procurement may also concentrate demand on preferred products and, conversely, reduce demand for competing, non-recommended products.
The effect of government's role on vaccine prices depends on whether and how the government actually procures vaccines, and its market share. In the US, the CDC began purchasing vaccines for low income children in 1966. During the 1980s, CDC's share increased, varying across years and across vaccines from around 30-40% for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussus (DTP) and polio, to 40-50% and higher for measles, mumps and rubella (MMR). In 1989-91 a measles epidemic resulted in thousands of cases of measles and hundreds of deaths. Following an investigation which showed that over half of children with measles had not been vaccinated, in 1993 Congress established the Vaccines for Children (VFC) program as an entitlement for children age 18 and below who may not otherwise have access to vaccines. 7 Consequently the public share of childhood vaccines increased to over 50%. Procurement strategies have varied over time, as purchasers learned about the effects of Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competitiontheir strategies on long term supply. Prior to 1993, the CDC applied a winner-take-all strategy, awarding all sales to the lowest bidder. This resulted in low prices and great volume uncertainty for suppliers. Since 1998, the CDC solicits bid prices annually, which suppliers can adjust monthly but only downward. The CDC posts bid prices of potential suppliers, negotiates broad supply contracts, usually with a near-zero minimum and a negotiated maximum quantity. State and local recipients of federal funds for vaccines purchased under the VFC program choose which approved supplier to use. States that participate in the Universal Purchase program may use their own funds to purchase vaccines for non-VFC-eligible patients at CDC prices.
In the private sector, vaccines are purchased by individual physicians and by hospitals and other institutions that often using group purchasing organization to negotiate prices with vaccine suppliers. These private purchasers are highly price sensitive because they usually face a fixed reimbursement per vaccine type from third party payers. Since they capture any margin, positive or negative, between the reimbursement and their acquisition cost for the vaccine, their cross-price demand elasticity between competing products is likely to be high. In such contexts, suppliers generally compete for market share by offering discounts below the reimbursement price.
The global vaccine market similarly consists of large concentrated purchasers, each with somewhat specific requirements. In most industrialized countries, national governments play a dominant role in defining vaccination schedules, vaccine procurement and price setting. Vaccine purchase for Latin America is largely managed by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), but each individual country decides which vaccines to purchase. Procurement and price negotiations are coordinated through PAHO, using competitive bidding. For developing countries, including purchases financed through GAVI, UNICEF serves as the procurement agency. For basic pediatric vaccines, UNICEF accounts for 40% of global volume but only 5% of market value. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of manufacturers offering UNICEF its key DTP, BCG (tuberculosis), TT (tetanus) and measles vaccines dwindled to three or four for each vaccine. 8 UNICEF has switched from winner-take-all procurement to spreading its demand across several suppliers, in order to keep them in the market and protect against supply interruptions. Most of the supply to UNICEF is now from Indian and other emerging market suppliers, with only small shares from the large multinational companies that supply the industrialized countries. This partly reflects differentiation of products, as the industrialized countries, especially the US, have moved towards newer, more costly combinations of basic vaccines, acellular pertussis, IPV, and thimerosalfree products, whereas UNICEF purchases older, cheaper formulations. 9 
Supply
Cost Structure. Bringing a new vaccine to market entails high fixed investments in R&D (research, compound formulation and clinical development) and manufacturing capacity, each component of which is subject to regulatory requirements for safety and quality assurance. The batch process required for vaccines also entails semi-fixed costs per batch. A batch may take 6-18 months to produce, depending on the type of vaccine and production methods. Thus production is characterized by very high fixed and semi-fixed sunk costs and low 244 P.M. Danzon and N.S. Pereira marginal cost per unit within each batch up to the capacity limit defined by the maximum number of batches for the manufacturing plant. 10 Changing production technology to meet changed regulatory standards or expand scale takes years and millions of dollars, and requires FDA approval for the new plant. Such costs may be worth incurring only if they can be recouped over several years of sales.
Costs related to regulatory compliance have increased over time to meet rising quality standards. In addition, several explicit shocks have necessitated major new investments. In particular, the 1972 requirement that all vaccines demonstrate efficacy imposed new costs on pre-1962 vaccines that had been grandfathered under the 1962 FDA Amendments. The 1999 CDC request that manufacturers remove thimerosal required product and plant redesign and reapproval of manufacturing processes and facilities. The removal of thimerosal, which is a preservative, may have exacerbated the short shelf life problem of vaccines, at least until new technologies could be developed and built into new plants.
Patents and Generic Entry. Patent barriers to entry of competitors are weak for most vaccines, which often rely on propriety strains of the virus and sometimes process patents. These do not preclude other firms from using different strains to supply competing products during the life of any patents. However, because vaccines are biologics, generics have not been able to use the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process which enables generic equivalents of chemical drugs to get approval by showing bioequivalence to the originator product. Thus follow-on versions of existing vaccines are treated as originators and must undertake de novo clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy. They would not necessarily be viewed by physicians/patients as perfect substitutes due to differences in vaccine strain.
Dynamic Competition. Although originator vaccines do not face generic competitors, their economic value is continually open to challenge by new, improved products. For example, acellular pertussis replaced whole cell pertussis; inactivated polio replaced oral polio; and combination products have replaced single product forms for most pediatric vaccines. 11 Anticipation of improved technologies undermines incentives to invest in new variants of older technologies or plants, particularly given the long lead times required by such investments. The tendency for dynamic entry of new, improved technologies to displace old technologies may be exacerbated by government recommendation of the new over the older product, and concentrated public and private purchasing.
Liability Risks. Tort liability has sometimes been a more severe risk for vaccines than for most therapeutic drugs, because vaccines treat large numbers of healthy individuals, usually children, and risks may be correlated. 12 Allegations and litigation related to the pertussis vaccine in the 1980s were followed by the exit of three of the four manufacturers of pertussis vaccine (Offit, 2005) . In 1986 Congress established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VCIP) to provide no-fault compensation to children injured as a result of pediatric vaccines. Influenza vaccine is also covered by the VCIP, and other vaccines may apply. Vaccine manufacturers may still occasionally face tort claims -for example, recent claims related to thimerosal argued that this was a preservative, not intrinsic to Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competitionthe vaccine. Although these claims have generally not succeeded, the legal costs of defending against claims and the risk that some may eventually succeed may act as a disincentive for vaccine entry. However, this risk is now probably modest, at least for pediatric vaccines that are covered by the VCIP.
Market Equilibrium
High fixed costs of regulation and production are not a barrier to entry if these costs can, with reasonable certainty, be recouped over large volume and/or high margins. But the interaction of high fixed costs with relatively low, concentrated and unpredictable demand and perishable supply is likely to result in a market equilibrium that supports only one or few suppliers in most vaccine markets at any point in time. If multiple firms initially enter and each faces non-increasing cost per unit, the equilibrium non-cooperative price is equal to marginal cost assuming Bertrand strategies 13 . The intuition is simple: once regulatory, capacity and batch costs are sunk, with few alternative customers in the current period and limited storage potential for future use, any excess of price above marginal cost contributes to covering the sunk costs, whereas if a firm loses a contract to a competitor, the product is likely to go to waste. Moreover, because capacity and batch production entail fixed and semifixed costs, respectively, that need to be planned a long time in advance, producers tend to target for high volumes of production as they cannot adjust later if demand is higher than anticipated. If such pricing is anticipated, all but one firm will eventually exit and new entry is unlikely, unless the new product has superior quality or lower cost than the incumbent. The likelihood of a sole supplier equilibrium is greater, the smaller the market relative to minimum efficient scale of production; the shorter the shelf-life of the product; and the more uniform are consumer preferences over product quality. Market dominance and survival in vaccines thus tends to be related to product superiority for the majority of patients, not to first mover advantage in a class.
Multiple products may coexist if they differ in efficacy or safety for different patient groups -for example, if some patients cannot tolerate one component of a combination, a variant that excludes that component may survive, as in the case of DTP and DT.
14 Even then, a single firm is likely to dominate in supplying these differentiated products if it has economies of scope from producing both the combination and the component products. By contrast, in many on-patent pharmaceutical classes multiple products coexist because each product works best for some patients; markets are generally larger; customers are mostly atomistic purchasers, are price-insensitive due to insurance, and are not driven by government recommendation; and the greater potential for storage enables manufacturers to inventory excess output for future sale.
With a sole supplier of a mandated childhood vaccine, the government share of the market becomes a bilateral monopoly: the government has significant monopsony power because the manufacturer has incurred significant sunk costs and has no other purchasers of comparable size, but the government also has no alternative suppliers. Given the declining number of producers, it is unsurprising that the CDC discounts decreased over time, from an average of 75% off the supplier's catalog price in 1987 to 50% in 1997, and that discounts are less on the newest, single manufacturer vaccines, such as varicella (9%) and pneumococcal conjugate (22%). 15 
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In summary, the role of government purchasing in US vaccine markets has been to define procurement rules for required vaccines that are eligible for government subsidy. Prior to 1998, this involved competitive tendering and centralized purchasing. Since 1998, the CDC simply solicits bids from willing suppliers and purchasing is devolved to the states. The only direct price regulation is a ceiling on price increases, set at the growth in the consumer price index (CPI), for vaccines that had federal contracts in 1993. This regulation created incentives for suppliers to develop new formulations of the price-constrained products -such as combinations -which are not subject to the CPI price cap. Of the 48 vaccine licenses in existence in the US in 2004, 17 were issued after 1993 (see Danzon et al., 2005 , Exhibit 1). Moreover, the fact that supplier exit and supply disruptions have occurred for flu vaccine, for which the government is a minor purchaser and does not set price, suggests that government purchase is not a necessary condition of firm exits (see below).
The conventional wisdom, that government purchase and "price controls" are the major contributors to lack of vaccine profitability, predicts that vaccine exit would be positively related to the quantity purchased by the government and inversely related to the government price. 16 By contrast, our model predicts that exit is triggered by static and dynamic competition, due to the high fixed costs and concentrated market demand. This model predicts that vaccine exit is positively related to the number of competitors and is more likely following entry of competitor vaccines that have some clear technological superiority, particularly if this superiority is reinforced by government recommendations. Similarly, entry of combination products is likely to displace the single components or smaller combinations.
In addition to withdrawal of vaccine products, the number of vaccine manufacturers has also been reduced through exit and mergers, including the acquisition of Connaught Laboratories by the Mérieux Institute in 1989 and Chiron's purchase of Sclavo in 1998 and Powderject in 2003. Merger of firms need not necessarily lead to exit of products; for example, if the merger is motivated by economies of scope across vaccine types, the range of combination products offered following a merger might increase. But if being acquired by another vaccine manufacturer is the least costly way of absorbing the excess production capacity for a product that has become obsolete, then an acquired product would be more likely to exit. In that case the merger would be a symptom rather than the underlying cause of the exit of the obsolete product.
Data and Methods
Data
We collected data on the dates of grant and withdrawal of all vaccine licenses authorized by the FDA for the period 1901 to 2003. For most of our analysis, the unit of observation is a vaccine product license, which authorizes a specific product and plant to manufacture that product. For vaccines that are used both alone and in various combinations, each component vaccine and each combination has a separate license and counts as a separate observation. For example, diphtheria vaccine exists alone and has been used in seven combinations, tetanus exists alone and has been used in eight combinations. During our time period, 241 licenses were granted, of which 179 were withdrawn and 62 survived as of 2003.
Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competition
We also report analysis of exit of vaccine suppliers at the firm level, using the FDA data on the firm holding the license. Thirty nine firms held at least one license during our time period; of these, 10 firms were acquired and 12 exited the vaccine business (measured by having no subsequent vaccine licenses).
We obtained quantities purchased and prices paid by CDC, by vaccine, for all years for which data were available. Where data were missing for a few years, we imputed missing values by extrapolating between adjacent values.
Methods, Variable Definitions and Hypotheses
Because we have interval censored data, we estimate a hazard model of vaccine exit, using a complementary log log function with time varying values of co-variates:
In equation (1), H jt is the hazard of exit of product j in period t, conditional on being licensed in period t-1. Explanatory variables include various measures of competition, C; measures of CDC purchase and other regulatory influence, R; other product-specific or firm-specific characteristics, Z; and other factors, X. These variables and related hypotheses are defined below.
Competition. Since many vaccines exist both as single products and in combination with other products (e.g. diphtheria + tetanus + pertussis (DTaP); measles, mumps, rubella (MMR)), there is no unique measure of number of competitors for each vaccine. We considered three alternative measures of number of competitor products: Direct Competitors is the number of variants of a specific vaccine (e.g. diphtheria alone) produced by competitor firms (excluding the firm in question), and Indirect Competitors includes all combinations that include the specific vaccine (e.g. all combinations that include diphtheria); and All Competitors is the sum of Direct and Indirect Competitors. Exit is expected to be positively related to both direct and indirect competition. Greater effects are predicted for Direct Competitors (same vaccine) if substitutability is the only issue; however, if patients prefer combination products over single vaccines (due to the greater convenience, lower time costs and perhaps lower out-ofpocket cost), then Indirect Competitors is expected to have a larger effect on exit hazards than Direct Competitors. We also include an indicator variable, Single, for products that are the sole source of a particular vaccine. Single products are less likely to exit, assuming that sole suppliers face higher mean and lower variance of expected revenue than producers that face competitors.
To test for effects of dynamic quality competition, we include the number of New Products of exactly the same vaccine type between years t and t+1. New product entry is expected to be increase the likelihood of exit of established products, if newer entrants on average have superior attributes compared to existing products. We also tested measures of entry defined over tÀ2 to t + 2. The measure reported here, based on entrants in t to t + 1, was consistently the most significant, suggesting that exit responds to anticipated as well as actual entry. This variable includes new vaccines introduced by each vaccine's parent firm, so it reflects a firm's own strategy as well as response to 248 P.M. Danzon and N.S. Pereira competitors (correct, it includes both new licenses by same or other firms). We also include a binary variable, Input, that takes the value 1 if a product is also an input for combinations produced by the same firm in period t.
Government Procurement and Liability Variables. Universal Recommendation is a binary indicator of whether the vaccine was recommended for universal purchase by the ACIP; it is expected to be negatively related to the product exit hazard, if ACIP recommendation increases demand for a vaccine. 17 Government procurement is predicted to have a negative effect on price but possibly a positive effect on volume, with uncertain net effect on exit hazards. To test these hypotheses, we tried three possible measures of the quantity of CDC purchase: total doses of each vaccine type that were purchased by CDC in tÀ1 (CDC Quantity); the expected number of doses purchased by CDC per licensee (CDCQ/licensee) assuming that the total government purchase were allocated equally among suppliers; and CDC share of doses (Share CDCq). These proxies for expected volume are expected to be negatively related to exit hazard, if CDC procurement increases expected demand for a vaccine. The price per dose paid by CDC for each vaccine type in tÀ1 (CDCPrice) is expected to be inversely related to the exit hazard. 18 All prices were inflation-adjusted using the CPI price index. A binary variable indicates the years before 1966, the first year of any CDC procurement (Pre CDC) and another binary variable indicates if a vaccine type was not purchased by CDC in tÀ1 (No CDC). 19 If the net effect of government procurement is to increase the likelihood of vaccine exit, the coefficient of No CDC should be negative. A similar prediction applies tentatively to Pre-CDC; however, since other factors also changed between the pre-1966 and post-1966 environment, including many more potential competitors in the market, the interpretation of this variable is ambiguous and it is included mainly as a control.
A binary variable, Strict Liability (SL) was created to indicate years after 1966, when the Second Restatement of Torts adopted strict product liability. The coefficient is expected to be positive if this increased the liability exposure of vaccine manufacturers in ways that could not be costlessly covered by insurance. 20 However, because SL is perfectly collinear with the Pre CDC indicator, both cannot be included in regression analysis. A binary variable, Vaccine Injury Compensation Program it-1 , indicates that the vaccine was covered by the VICP in year t-1; the coefficient is expected to be negative if, by reducing expected liability costs, the VICP significantly increased manufacturers' incentives to remain in the market. We also include an indicator Thimerosal, which indicates vaccines that contained thimerosal in years after 1998; it is expected to be positive, if the requirement to remove thimerosal imposed in early 1999 contributed to vaccine exit. OBRA is an indicator for vaccines that were subject to the CPI cap on price increases; it is expected to be positive if this constraint was binding.
Product and Firm-Specific Factors. Age is the number of years since the product license was first granted; it is expected to be positive if new products offer superior quality and hence tend to displace older products. Year of Entry measures the vaccine's year of launch. Acquired is a binary indicator for vaccines that have been acquired from the original licensee; the coefficient is expected to be positive if acquisition is a means to exit the market and transfer 
To test whether vaccines are less likely to be withdrawn if the manufacturer has a large or diversified vaccine portfolio across which to spread firmspecific fixed costs, we include a Herfindahl index of concentration of each manufacturer's products over vaccine types. 21 If economies of scope across vaccine types are significant, due to spreading fixed costs of human or physical capital, risk diversification or potential for product combination, then exit is less likely for diversified firms. Table 1 lists variable definitions with means and standard deviations. Figure 2 plots the mean number of products of given vaccine type, by year from the date of first launch of that type. The predicting equation is a simple regression of number of competitors on an intercept and a quadratic in years since launch, all of which are significant at the 1% level. Separate estimates are made for Direct Competitors (same product) and for Indirect Competitors (combinations that include this product). 22 Interestingly, entry occurs mainly in Indirect Competitors. The predicted number of Direct Competitors increases slowly from launch to reach a maximum of about four and then declines slowly. By contrast, the predicted number of Indirect Competitors increases more sharply and peaks at roughly Table 2 . Impact of competition (hazard ratios) Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competition Table 2 .
Descriptive Evidence
No CDC 
14.
23 Note that within the average pattern of life-cycle entry shown in Figure 2 , the experience varies across different vaccine types. In particular, some of the mandated pediatric vaccines, especially diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, were in numerous combinations in the 1970s and then were combined with Hib, Hepatitis B and inactivated polio more recently. At the other extreme, vaccines such as smallpox, rabies, cholera, lyme disease, have had only one or two suppliers throughout their life-cycles and have never been combined with other vaccines. We report the multivariate analysis of product exit based on the full sample; however, results were essentially the same and significance increased slightly when we excluded those vaccines that had only a single producer over the entire period. Table 2 reports hazard ratios from the hazard function analysis of vaccine exit, including measures of competition, regulation, product and firm characteristics. Table 3 reports alternative specifications to estimate the effects of CDC purchase, controlling only for product age and year of entry. The coefficients are hazard ratios, hence values less (greater) than 1 imply reduced (increased) probability of exit.
Hazard Function Analysis of Vaccine Exit
In Table 2 , the first equation includes only basic product characteristics and a control for the pre-CDC time period which is also the period before formal adoption of strict liability. Unfortunately, because both the procurement Table 3 . Market trend and CDC's role (hazard ratios) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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and the legal regime changed in 1966 these two variables are highly correlated and cannot be included together. Successive specifications then add various measures of competition, firm characteristics and regulation. The hazard rate of exit increases between 5 and 9% for each year the vaccine is on the market. However, this rate also increases around 3 to 6% with year of entry, implying that newer vintage vaccines are at higher risk of exit. These estimates are robust to the addition of measures of competition, regulation and other characteristics. The pre-CDC indicator is strongly negative, implying that vaccine exit risk was much lower in the pre-CDC/pre-Strict liability era. The estimated effect of the pre-CDC indicator declines but remains significantly negative in specifications that control for measures of competition, and CDC prices and quantities.
Controlling for these basic product and time period characteristics, each additional Direct Competitor increases the exit hazard rate by roughly 3%, and each additional Indirect Competitor increases exit hazard rate by 2%. Controlling for number of competitors in year t, the entry of new competitors in year t to t + 1 increases the exit hazard of established products by 2-3%, consistent with the dynamic competition hypothesis, that new entrants are typically superior products and therefore tend to accelerate the exit of established products. Vaccines that are monopoly suppliers (Single) have an exit hazard over 50% lower than vaccines that have competitors. This supports the hypothesis that competition contributes to low prices and hence that sole supplier products are more able to achieve prices necessary to cover long run costs. Vaccines that are inputs to combinations have a rate 70% lower exit hazard than other vaccines, as expected if these core input vaccines tend to complement rather than substitute for the combination vaccines to which they contribute.
The effects of policy variables are mixed. Vaccines that are recommended for Universal Purchase have a 60% lower exit rate. Controlling for Universal Purchase, we find no significant effect of whether or not the CDC is a purchaser of the vaccine, the volume of units purchased by the CDC or the CDC price. Similarly, we find no significant effect of eligibility for the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program or the indicator that a vaccine was subject to the OBRA price control. Following the adverse publicity over thimerosal in 1998 and requirement to eliminate it in early 1999, products that contained thimerosal have an exit hazard that is 44% higher. Although this coefficient is not significant at conventional levels, this may reflect the very small number of products involved.
Vaccines that have been acquired are less likely to exit than vaccines that are still owned by their originator firm, but this result is not significant. This evidence suggests that merger of firms has not been a major contributor to exit of vaccine products, although it has reduced the number of vaccine suppliers. Rather, the evidence here tentatively supports the theory of merger as a market for corporate control, in which vaccines are acquired in order to enhance their market potential, not as a means to eliminate excess capacity. The Herfindahl measure of a firm's vaccine portfolio is not significant. However, vaccines produced by foreign firms are less likely to exit, exhibiting a hazard rate that is close to 70% lower than US firms. This could suggest that foreign firms face higher regulatory and other costs of entry, such that foreign firms only launch in the US the subset of their products that have atypically high potential value and survival potential.
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P.M. Danzon and N.S. Pereira Table 3 reports more detailed attempts to estimate the effects of CDC purchasing. Controlling for a vaccine's age and cohort, the indicator for the pre-CDC time period is strongly negative, implying increased exit risk in the post-CDC time period. Given the highly correlated timing of increased government purchasing by CDC, increased tort liability risk following the 1966 Second Restatement of Torts and increased FDA-related costs after the 1962 FDA Amendments, their marginal contributions cannot be identified and the Pre-CDC variable must be interpreted as reflecting their combined effects. Controlling for these factors, the coefficient on the indicator for no CDC purchase is positive but not significant. The measures of CDC quantity are not significant. The CDC price is negative, consistent with the expectation that a lower price should increase the exit hazard, but the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. Our CDC price and quantity variables may be measured with error, which may create bias towards finding no significant effects. We lack data on private sector prices and hence are unable to normalize the CDC price by the private sector price. Even if list prices to private purchasers were available, these would not measure transactions prices which are often significantly discounted. Overall, these results based on the universe of vaccines for the entire industry lifetime suggest that having a Universal Purchase recommendation significantly reduces the probability of exit, consistent with the prediction that universal purchase increases demand for a vaccine. However, the volume and price of CDC purchase do not appear to have significant effects, possibly because the negative effect of government purchase on price is offset by the positive effect on volume, leading to no significant net effect. The probability of exit was lower before 1966, but whether this reflects absence of CDC purchasing, lower liability threat or other factors cannot be distinguished given the correlation between these factors. Table 5 . Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competition Table 5 . We also examined the exit of firms (as opposed to individual products) from the vaccine business. Explanatory power is lower, implying that there are unmeasured firm-specific factors underling each firm's decision to exit the vaccines market, although some common features may underlie these decisions. Table 4 presents the hazard rates for exit of firms from the vaccine market for any reason. 24 Firm exit probability increases around 10% for each year the firm has been in the market, which is consistent with the hypothesis that increasing costs of regulatory compliance as technologies become obsolete may contribute to the probability of exit of firms. At the same time, firms that entered the market later are less likely to stay in the market and are more likely to be acquired, possibly because these are small firms formed to develop newer technologies that become desirable to established firms. Although having recently obtained a new license does not affect the likelihood of firm exit, it decreases the likelihood of a firm being acquired.
Evidence from Other Industrialized Countries
High fixed costs would be most widely spread if each vaccine were distributed globally. In fact, the diffusion of vaccines appears to be more limited than for many drugs, even across industrialized countries. Table 5 lists the licensed producers of each of the major pediatric vaccines and several adult vaccines in Canada, France, Portugal, the UK, and the US.
These data are broadly consistent with hypotheses outlined here, that vaccine production entails high country-specific fixed costs and concentrated demand, such that each market supports at most a few producers. As predicted, each country has few producers of each vaccine. However, for several vaccine types, the US has fewer producers than these other countries which all have smaller potential volumes and more dominant government purchase. 25 The fact that several firms have products available in these countries that are not available in the US suggests that entry into the US is not attractive, given the fixed costs of entry combined with price and volume uncertainty of competing with established products.
The number of licenses per manufacturer and vaccine is also often higher in Canada and Europe than in the US. This suggests that the cost of compliance with more stringent regulatory requirements may contribute to fewer licensed products being maintained in the US. Note that in Table 5 the US licenses include some that are inactive and some for further manufacturing only, hence this count of licenses overstates the number of active producers in the US. These data also indicate that, although national immunization plans are similar across developed countries, the specific vaccines recommended within each category still vary, for example, in the use of combination vaccines. Country-specific requirements limit the potential for manufacturing economies of scale and may require the development of country-specific products.
Flu Vaccine -A Case Study
A brief history of the supply of flu vaccine in the US illustrates how fixed costs, dynamic competition and preemptive effects of superior products can lead to few suppliers, despite a limited role for government purchase.
Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competition Table 6 . Table 6 . Influenza is an extreme case of limited storability. The influenza virus has two strains: Type A, which has several subtypes, and Type B. Because these types undergo antigenic "drift", the influenza vaccine must be reformulated each year to match the circulating strains. Since 1998, the World Health Organization has issued separate recommendations in February and September for the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, respectively. 26 In the US, the vaccine composition for the upcoming flu season is determined between February and March. Since the peak flu season is November-March, manufacturers must supply the vaccine by October to early November.
The injectable vaccine is traditionally cultured on embryonic eggs and then sterilized. Monovalent concentrates are produced and combined into the multivalent form, with comprehensive quality control at each step in the process. This time consuming process requires that supply be estimated almost a year in advance, and quick ramp up of production is impossible. A newer method of culturing the viruses using mammalian cells is not yet approved in the US.
There has been a significant increase in flu vaccine production above the approximately 20 million doses distributed annually in the mid-1980s. 27 In (Table 6 ). Actual uptake has increased but remains unpredictable at less than 50% of the recommended population. In 2001, only 87.7 million of the recommended 152 million people were vaccinated. 28 In 2003, although recommended recipients increased to 182 million, manufacturers distributed only 83 million doses. 29 In 1999, there were four manufacturers in the US producing a total of 77.9 million doses: Aventis Pasteur, Wyeth, Parkedale (owned by King Pharmaceuticals), and Powderject (acquired by Chiron, now part of Novartis). In October 1999, Parkedale was cited by the FDA for violations of manufacturing standards. Six months later, Parkedale was ordered to halt production and distribution because it remained out of compliance. On 27 September 2000 the FDA again ordered operations halted, giving the company 30 days to implement changes. But given the short window for effective vaccination, it was unlikely that the necessary changes could be completed for that year's season. Instead, Parkedale announced its withdrawal from flu vaccine production, writing off some $45 million rather than incurring the costs of upgrading. Wyeth had produced influenza vaccine for the US market for over two decades. In October of 2000, Wyeth was fined $30 million for the violations and an additional $15,000 per day out of compliance (capped at $5 million). 30 In November 2002, Wyeth announced that it would exit, which left only two manufacturers of injectible influenza vaccine. 31 In December 2002, shortly after Wyeth's exit, Aventis pledged $80 million investment to increase filling and formulation capacity, in addition to significant capital investments in 2001 to increase its capacity by 20%. 32 In early 2003, Chiron acquired its Liverpool plant from Powderject and began aggressive expansion to serve the expected growth in US demand. Chiron produced 25.6 million doses in 2002, and 35.6 million in 2003. Before being shut down by the UK regulatory authorities just weeks before the 2004 influenza season, Chiron estimated it would produce 46-48 million doses for the US. It has been suggested this rapid expansion at an aging factory contributed to the contamination problems that occurred. 33 About $75 million has been spent to upgrade the factory in the last five years. In addition, Chiron committed to spending another $100 million to replace part of the plant. 34 In July 2003, FluMist, an intranasally administered, live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV), produced by MedImmune was approved. But because of its restricted indications (initially, for use in healthy people aged 5-50) and its relatively high price, FluMist captured only a small share of the expanding market. More generally, LAIV products are unlikely to alleviate vaccine shortages because they are restricted to low risk individuals and they rely on the same embryonic egg based process. For 2004-05, MedImmune planned to make only 2 million doses, despite a capacity to make 20 million doses. 35 This shrinkage of the number of flu vaccine suppliers cannot be blamed on government purchase and price controls. Less than 20% of flu vaccine is publicly purchased. 36 Medicare reimburses for flu vaccine at 95% of Average Wholesale Price (AWP), which is a list price set by pricing guides such as the Red Book, based on the manufacturers' list price to wholesalers. 37 Although provider reimbursement is at 95% of AWP, manufacturer prices are determined by competitive bids for sales to physicians, hospitals and others who dispense flu vaccine. Thus manufacturer prices for flu vaccines reflect competition rather than regulation. Given the high fixed costs and low marginal costs and total absence of storability of flu vaccine, it is not surprising that competition leads to low prices. Faced with low prices and volatile demand, manufacturers have chosen to exit rather than incur the significant costs of bringing manufacturing capacity up to the high standards required. Unpredictability resulting from the production technology and the very short demand window are also critical. Despite the reality of repeated shortages, millions of doses are wasted each year, because of overall demand uncertainty and mismatch of supply to meet the narrow demand window (see Table 6 ).
But the US flu market also illustrates the importance of threat of dynamic competition from superior products in vaccine investment decisions. While manufacturers are reluctant to invest additional capacity based on current embryonic egg based methods, several companies are developing mammalian cell-based vaccines. Mammalian cell-derived vaccines are expected to provide equivalent or better efficacy, with lower contamination risk, less wastage and shorter production time (see Table 7 ). 38 In 2003, Solvay's Influvac TC (cell culture) product was approved in the Netherlands, and since then has been approved in over 60 countries. 39 No cell 40 Given the potential superiority of cell-based products, egg-based products are likely to become obsolete, hence further investment in egg-based capacity is not worthwhile without government subsidy. In November 2009, Novartis inaugurated the US's first large scale flu cell culture vaccine manufacturing facility, which is planned to be running at full scale commercial production in 2013. 41 At the same time, an FDA advisory panel rejected approval of the US's first cell-based influenza vaccine developed by Protein Sciences Corporation. 42 The global supply of flu vaccines (Table 8) shows a lack of global diffusion similar to other vaccines in Table 5 . There are over 30 manufacturers of flu vaccine worldwide but many operate in a limited number of countries. 43 Solvay (now part of Abbott Laboratories), one of the EU's largest suppliers and the leader in the new cell-based methods, does not have a product approved in the US as of December 2010. Despite potential for growth in the US market and lack of government price controls, there was little incentive for other companies to enter or expand using the old technology, although entry was anticipated and is now occurring with newer technologies that will likely eventually render the old technology obsolete. Nevertheless, and even though the market for seasonal influenza vaccines across the seven major markets (United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK), has had a strong compound annual growth rate of 12.6% since 2005, in fact the US market is still dominated by a small number of firms, with Sanofi-Pasteur, GSK and Novartis (formerly Chiron) producing more than 90% of the vaccines. 45 Since this demand growth will likely flatten off, further consolidation of this market may be likely.
Conclusions
This analysis suggests that US vaccine markets are likely to reach equilibrium with only one or at most a few suppliers of each vaccine type. This reflects the interaction of high fixed costs with concentrated, price-sensitive demand and dynamic quality competition in which product superiority is reinforced by government recommendation. In such conditions, there is no incentive to introduce "me-too" vaccines, which could not plausibly compete with established firms unless they offer some clear quality or cost advantage. Consequently, new vaccine R&D targets improved technologies for existing vaccines or new vaccine categories. Entry of superior products in turn leads to exit of the now obsolete inferior products. Many vaccines that are approved in other industrialized markets have not applied to enter the US, presumably due in part to Vaccine Supply: Effects of Regulation and Competitionhigh costs of regulatory approval and manufacturing compliance, combined with limited and risky demand, with both price and volume uncertainty if multiple firms are competing for the business. The flu vaccine illustrates the contribution to supply problems of high regulatory hurdles, fixed costs, demand uncertainty and the threat of dynamic competition. Pediatric vaccines face similar regulatory, cost and dynamic competitive conditions; pricing may be more controlled, due to the large market share purchased by the CDC, but volume is more predictable, provided that there are only one or two suppliers in the market.
These economic realities pose difficult policy challenges. Harmonization of country-specific regulatory requirements might increase the diffusion of products across the industrialized markets, particularly between the EU, Canada and the US. However, given the importance of vaccine policy to public health, national health authorities are unlikely to delegate autonomy on vaccine recommendations and schedules. Perhaps the best hope comes from scientific advances that may improve the storability of vaccines or reduce the lead time required for production. Such improvements would mitigate temporary supply disruptions. Although stockpiles would not protect against withdrawal of a sole supplier, both theory and our empirical evidence show that a sole supplier is much less likely to exit, unless a superior product enters the market. But while new technologies are our best hope in the long run, in the short run new technologies may exacerbate supply shortages, by undermining incentives to invest in older plants that are destined to become obsolete.
Notes
